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Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation 
Eldon E. Fallon∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1968, Congress enacted The Multidistrict Litigation Act.1 
This Act bestowed upon a panel of seven federal judges (the Panel), 
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States, broad powers to 
transfer groups of cases filed in multiple federal district courts to a 
single federal district court for the purpose of coordinating and 
conducting pretrial proceedings.2 This transfer is made without 
consideration of personal jurisdiction over the parties or the venue 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1404.3 In making such a transfer from 
the court in which the case was filed (the transferor court) to the 
court designated to receive the cases (the transferee court), the Panel 
considers whether there are sufficient common questions of fact 
among these civil actions to justify centralizing them in a single 
district to further the convenience of the parties and witnesses and to 
promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions.4 The Panel 
may carry out this function either upon its own initiative or in 
response to a motion filed with the Panel by a party in any action in 
which transfer might be appropriate.5 
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 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
 2. See Gregory Hansel, Extreme Litigation: An Interview with Judge Wm. 
Terrell Hodges, Chairman of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 19 
ME. B. J. 16, 18 (2004). See generally John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: 
Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225 (2008); John F. Nangle, From the 
Horse’s Mouth: The Workings of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 66 
DEF. COUNS. J. 341 (1999). 
 3. See In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig., 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 
1976) (“Transfers under Section 1407 are simply not encumbered by 
considerations of in personam jurisdiction and venue.”). 
 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) which provides, inter alia: 
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are 
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any 
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such 
transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation 
authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such 
proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will 
promote the just and efficient conduct of such action. 
Id. 
 5. Id. § 1407(c). 
372 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
When the Panel finds that centralization of related actions is 
appropriate, a multidistrict litigation (MDL) case is formally created 
by the issuance of a transfer order.6 The Panel’s transfer order 
designates the transferee court, assigns a title and number to the 
MDL, and identifies the related actions currently pending in federal 
districts outside of the selected transferee forum that will be 
transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. These cases, together with 
any related actions originally filed in the transferee forum, constitute 
the MDL. If the Panel subsequently learns of additional related 
cases, it will issue conditional transfer orders identifying tag-along 
actions that will be sent to join the MDL.7 The finality of the 
transfer order is delayed for seven days to permit the opportunity to 
object to the transfer.8 Transferor courts retain jurisdiction over 
cases subject to conditional transfer orders until such orders become 
final. Occasionally, the Panel will vacate a conditional transfer order 
before it becomes final, typically based either on a well-founded 
objection or in light of the dismissal or remand of an action by the 
transferor court.  
In the early decades of multidistrict litigation, business was 
slow. The 1970s and 1980s saw some modest increase, but since the 
1990s, the workload of the Panel has substantially increased.9 This 
increase is generally attributed to the change in the nature of civil 
litigation, which has placed greater emphasis on class actions, mass 
torts, and complex litigation. Presently, with the passage of the Class 
Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and the general disfavor of nationwide 
class actions expressed by several U.S. circuit courts, multidistrict 
litigation is playing an increasingly significant quantitative role in 
                                                                                                             
 6. Id. 
 7. A tag-along action is “a civil action pending in a district court which 
involves common questions of fact with either (1) actions on a pending motion to 
transfer to create an MDL or (2) actions previously transferred to an existing 
MDL, and which the Panel would consider transferring under Section 1407.” 
Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Rule 1.1(h), 
277 F.R.D. 480 (2011) [hereinafter Panel Rules]. 
 8. See id. Rule 7.1(b). 
 9. See Heyburn, supra note 2, at 2231; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1 (1980), available at http://www.jpml.us 
courts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Legacy_Statistical_Reports-1980-1991-Compressed.pdf 
(reporting that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, between July 1, 1979, to June 30, 1980, 
the Panel acted upon 1,386 civil actions); ANNUAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2011), available at 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Annual_Statistics_CY_2011-
Revised.pdf (during the 12-month period ending September 30, 2011, the Panel 
acted upon 43,769 civil actions). 
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all civil litigation in the United States.10 Some estimates suggest that 
MDL cases account for more than 15% of all civil litigation in this 
country.11 Many MDLs include thousands of individual cases and 
multiple class actions. Hundreds of lawyers from various parts of 
the country might be involved in a single MDL case. It is necessary 
for an MDL transferee judge to impose some organizational 
structure on the attorney representation so that the case can proceed 
in an effective and efficient manner.12 To accomplish this task, the 
court usually appoints a Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (PSC) to 
speak for all of the plaintiffs and their lawyers and a Defendant(s)’ 
Steering Committee (DSC) to speak for the defendant(s).13 But in 
practice, the DSC is generally selected by the defendant itself with 
the approval of the court.14 
The committees occupy leadership roles in the litigation—
conducting documentary discovery, establishing document 
depositories, taking depositions, arguing motions, conducting 
bellwether trials, and in general, carrying out the duties and 
responsibilities set forth in the court’s pretrial orders, including 
appearing before the court at periodic conferences or hearings.15 The 
MDL transferee court theoretically oversees the discovery aspect of 
the case and remands various cases back to the transferor courts for 
further proceedings.16 In practice, however, it is not unusual for the 
                                                                                                             
 10. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4; see 
also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746–47 (5th Cir. 1996); In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299–1304 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 11. John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving 
the MDL Process, LITIGATION, Spring 2012, at 26. 
 12. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.6 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 
MANUAL]. 
 13. See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
2047, at 1–2 (E.D. La. July 27, 2009) (pretrial order appointing Defendants’ 
Steering Committee), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/Drywall/Orders 
/Orders.htm (follow “Pretrial Order 7” hyperlink); In re Chinese-Manufactured 
Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2047 (E.D. La. July 27, 2009) (pretrial 
order appointing Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee), available at http://www.laed 
.uscourts.gov/Drywall/Orders/Orders.htm (follow “Pretrial Order 8” hyperlink); In 
re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2005 WL 850963, at *1 (E.D. La. 
Apr. 8, 2005) (pretrial order appointing Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee); In re 
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2005 WL 850962, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 
8, 2005) (pretrial order appointing Defendants’ Steering Committee). 
 14. See MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 22.61, 22.62. 
 15. See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
2047, at 2–4 (E.D. La. July 27, 2009) (pretrial order appointing Defendants’ 
Steering Committee), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/Drywall/Orders 
/Orders.htm (follow “Pretrial Order 7” hyperlink); In re Vioxx, 2005 WL 850963, 
at *1–9; In re Vioxx, 2005 WL 850962, at *1–2. 
 16. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 
(1998). 
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transferee court to conduct bellwether trials and encourage a global 
resolution of the matter before recommending to the Panel that the 
case be remanded.17 All of this work consumes time and raises 
costs. While the members of the DSC are typically compensated by 
their client on a regular basis, the members of the PSC are not. 
Because the work that the PSC performs inures to the common 
benefit of all plaintiffs and their primary counsel (the counsel that 
they employed), MDL transferee courts usually establish a 
procedure for creating a common benefit fee to compensate the 
members of the PSC and the members of any subcommittees who 
have done common benefit work.18  
This Article discusses the history of the common benefit fee 
concept, how the amount of the common benefit fee is computed, 
the eligibility requirements for claiming common benefit fees, and 
the method for determining how these fees should be distributed 
among those who have done common benefit work. 
I. HISTORY OF THE COMMON BENEFIT FEE DOCTRINE 
Under the general rule prevalent in American courts, known as 
the “American Rule,” the attorney for the prevailing litigant is 
ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorney’s fee from the 
loser.19 Instead, the attorney for the prevailing litigant must look to 
his or her own client for payment of attorney’s fees. Since the 19th 
century, however, the Supreme Court has recognized an equitable 
exception to the American Rule.20 This exception, which has 
become known as the “common fund doctrine” or the “common 
benefit doctrine,” permits the creation of a common fund for the 
                                                                                                             
 17. The authority to remand an action to the transferor court rests with the 
Panel and not the transferee court. See In re Roberts, 178 F.3d 181, 183–84 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) and the Supreme Court decision in 
Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 26, signify that the power to remand a transferred case to the 
transferor court lies with the Panel and not with the transferee district judge, a 
conclusion further supported by Panel Rules, supra note 7, at Rule 14). However, 
in practice, the Panel usually acts favorably on the transferee court’s 
recommendation. For a more in depth discussion of the use of bellwether trials in 
multidistrict litigation, see Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard 
Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323 (2008). 
 18. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (explaining the 
Court’s historical recognition that “a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the 
benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole”); MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 14.11, 
14.12. 
 19. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 
546, 561 (1986). 
 20. See, e.g., Internal Imp. Fund Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 537–38 
(1881); Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. of Ga. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 127–28 (1885). 
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purpose of paying reasonable attorneys’ fees. The fund is created by 
taxing persons other than a particular client for legal services 
beneficial to such persons thus spreading the cost of the litigation to 
all beneficiaries of these services.21 Under the common fund 
concept, the funds are actually accumulated from those aligned with 
the successful litigant and not extracted from the defeated adversary; 
thus, one might argue that it is not technically an exception to the 
American Rule.22 But regardless of its taxonomy, the common fund 
doctrine constitutes a departure from the traditional rule that each 
litigant bears his or her own costs. 
The common fund doctrine was originally, and perhaps still is, 
most commonly applied to awards of attorneys’ fees in class 
actions.23 But this doctrine is not limited solely to class actions: It 
has been used in complex litigation to compensate attorneys whose 
work benefits others similarly situated.24 As class actions were 
combined with individual actions to form MDLs, as is the modern 
trend, the common benefit concept migrated into the latter area.25 It 
                                                                                                             
 21. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 594 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2010); 
see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at 1 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 
2005) (Pretrial Order No. 19); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1355, 
at 1 (E.D. La. Dec. 26, 2011) (pretrial order establishing Plaintiffs’ Litigation 
Expense Fund), available at http://propulsid.laed.uscourts.gov/orders.htm (follow 
“Pretrial Order No. 16” hyperlink). 
 22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
30 reporter’s note a (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004) (commenting on “[t]he 
persistent and confusing identification of common-fund recovery as an ‘exception’ 
to the American rule on attorneys’ fees,” and noting that in a common fund 
situation the funds are actually distributed “among those aligned with the plaintiff 
rather than extract[ed] . . . from the defeated adversary” (quoting Thomas D. 
Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 
DUKE L.J. 651, 662 (1982))). 
 23. See, e.g., 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 13:76 (4th. ed. 2002) (discussing common fund doctrine in context of 
class actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
 24. See generally Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) 
(employing common benefit doctrine to award fees and costs to litigant whose 
success benefitted unrelated parties by establishing their legal rights). See also 
ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE SHEEHEY, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ 
FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION 60 (2d ed. 2005) (“Although many 
common fund cases are class actions . . . the common fund doctrine is not limited 
to class actions.”); MANUAL, supra note 12, § 14:121. 
 25. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011); In re Oil Spill 
by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL 
No. 2179 (E.D. La. June 15, 2012) (order setting caps on individual attorney’s 
fees), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/Orders.htm 
(follow “June 15 2012 Order” hyperlink); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. 
Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. La. 2011); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators 
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *5 (D. Minn. 2008); 
In re Zyprexa, Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 272–73 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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has been used to compensate attorneys who render legal services 
beneficial to all MDL plaintiffs. Courts have justified this approach 
by postulating that MDLs are quasi-class actions because, like class 
actions, they involve large numbers of cases grouped together and 
handled by one judge for efficiency, consistency, and coordination.26 
The theoretical bases for the application of the common fund concept 
to MDLs are the same as for class actions—namely, equity and her 
blood brother, quantum meriut. However, there is a difference: In 
class actions the beneficiary of the common benefit work is the 
claimant; in MDLs the beneficiary is the primary attorney (the 
attorney who has the representation agreement with the claimant). For 
this reason, in MDLs, the common benefit fee is extracted from the 
fee of the primary attorney and not the claimant, as is the case with 
class actions. Thus in MDLs, the claimant does not pay the common 
benefit fee; the primary attorney who is the beneficiary of the 
common benefit work pays it.27 
                                                                                                             
 26. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (holding the “large number of plaintiffs subject to the settlement matrix 
approved by court; the utilization of special masters appointed by the court to 
control discovery and to assist in reaching and administering a settlement; the 
court’s order for a huge escrow fund; and other interventions by the court” in the 
MDL litigation are the same characteristics of a class action and thus the MDL 
should be considered a “quasi-class action”); In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174, at 
*5 (asserting that “when such a fund is for all practical purposes created for the 
benefit of others, the formalities of the litigation—the absence of an avowed class 
suit or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare decisis rather than through a 
decree—hardly touch the power of equity in doing justice as between a party and 
the beneficiaries of his litigation”) (quoting Sprague, 307 U.S. at 167); In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig. 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. La. 2009); see also Edward F. 
Sherman, Judicial Supervision of Attorney Fees in Aggregate Litigation: The 
American Vioxx Experience as Example for Other Countries 11 (Tul. Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 09-07), available at http://ssrn.com /abstract=1407559 
(finding 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) offers some support to the argument that MDLs are 
quasi-class actions). But see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class 
Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 113 (2010) (maintaining MDLs do not constitute quasi-
class actions, as MDLs merely aggregate individual lawsuits under 28 U.S.C. § 
1407 to promote judicial efficiency and those suits are not “not certified under the 
[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 23 standards of commonality, typicality, 
numerosity, adequacy of representation, predominance, and superiority; there is no 
representative plaintiff; and there is no attorney appointed by the court as counsel 
for the entire class”); Aimee Lewis, Limiting Justice: The Problem of Judicially 
Imposed Caps on Contingent Fees in Mass Actions, 31 REV. LITIG. 209, 215 
(2012) (asserting a key difference between class actions and MDL cases is that 
MDL litigants have already brought their claims to court and likely sought 
representation prior to those filings, while class actions include all class members 
whether or not they brought suit). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 658 (E.D. 
La. 2010) (ordering the common benefit fee of 6.5% to be extracted from the 32% 
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In addition to turning to class actions for authority to utilize the 
common benefit concept in MDLs, courts also find support in their 
inherent managerial authority, particularly in light of the complex 
nature of an MDL. The Fifth Circuit has long recognized that a 
court’s power to consolidate and manage litigation necessarily 
implies a corollary authority to appoint lead or liaison counsel and to 
compensate them for their work.28 In In re Air Crash Disaster at 
Florida Everglades on December 29, 1972, the Panel transferred all 
federal cases arising out of a passenger plane crash near Miami to 
the Southern District of Florida.29 The transferee court appointed a 
plaintiffs’ committee to coordinate discovery and pretrial matters 
and then to conduct bellwether trials.30 The court compensated the 
committee through an assessment on the contingent fees of attorneys 
who represented MDL plaintiffs but were not on the plaintiffs’ 
committee.31 The non-committee attorneys appealed, and the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s authority to impose that 
assessment.32 The Fifth Circuit explained that a district court has 
inherent authority “to bring management power to bear upon 
massive and complex litigation to prevent [the litigation] from 
monopolizing the services of the court to the exclusion of other 
litigants.”33 Therefore, an MDL court “may designate one attorney 
or set of attorneys to handle pre-trial activity on aspects of the case 
where the interests of all co-parties coincide.”34 Naturally, this 
authority would be “illusory if it is dependent upon lead counsel’s 
performing the duties desired of them for no additional 
compensation.”35 Assessment of those fees against other retained 
lawyers who benefitted from the work done was permissible and 
appropriate.36 
                                                                                                             
 
fee of the primary counsel); see also Smiley v. Sincoff, 958 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 
1992) (affirming order providing that “any committee fee was to be paid by all 
attorneys on behalf of their clients. Plaintiffs were not to pay fees to the committee 
out of their own recoveries.”); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 
256, 266–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 28. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 
549 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1009. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1012. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1014. 
 35. Id. at 1016. 
 36. See id. at 1019–20; see also In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 
524, 546–47 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06 MD 
1811 CDP, 2010 WL 716190, at *4 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (“An MDL court’s authority 
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Finally, in addition to justifying the use of the common benefit 
doctrine on principles of equity or quantum meruit or class action 
procedures or their inherent authority, MDL transferee courts often 
derive express authority to set common benefit fees from the terms 
of the settlement agreement of the parties, to which their primary 
attorneys consented. Some MDL cases utilize the settlement class 
vehicle created by Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to amicably resolve the case. As with other class actions, 
claimants with adequate notice must opt out of the settlement to 
avoid being bound by its terms. When this procedure is utilized, the 
court has statutory authority to set common benefit fees pursuant to 
Rule 23(h), which allows the court to award reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and nontaxable costs. But an increasing number of MDLs 
utilize a private settlement agreement to resolve claims. The 
agreement contains the terms of the settlement, which provide the 
total dollar amount of the settlement and the mechanism for 
allocating the funds among eligible claimants. In addition, the 
agreement usually contains a provision establishing a fund for 
common benefit work. For example, in the Vioxx Products Liability 
Litigation,37 section 9.2 of the settlement agreement governed 
common benefit fees, expressly authorized the transferee court to 
determine the amount of the common benefit attorneys’ fees, and 
provided that the fees were to be deducted from the fee of the 
primary plaintiffs’ attorneys.38 The agreement is usually an opt-in 
                                                                                                             
 
to establish a trust and to order contributions to compensate leadership counsel 
derives from its ‘managerial’ power over the consolidated litigation, and, to some 
extent, from its inherent equitable power.”); id. at *4 n.2 (relying on common fund 
doctrine as an alternate basis to inherent managerial authority and concluding that 
“[b]oth sources of authority provide the same result”); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 648–49 (E.D. La. 2009); In re Guidant Corp. 
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 
2008 WL 682174, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 265–66 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. 
Litig., MDL No. 1355, 2005 WL 3541041, at *1–2 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2005) 
(pretrial order distributing attorneys’ fee funds); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 
292 F. Supp. 2d 644, 653–56 (E.D. Pa. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 22, § 30 (“In contrast to the 
standard view of class-action fees, which explains them as restitutionary, the 
leading accounts of fees to court-appointed counsel in consolidated litigation 
properly emphasize factors independent of restitution to justify the imposition of a 
liability by court order.” (citing In re Air Crash, 549 F.2d at 1017–19)); MANUAL, 
supra note 12, § 22.62. 
 37. 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 771 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 38. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. La. 
2009). 
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agreement; when a claimant opts into the agreement, the claimant 
and the claimant’s primary counsel agree to be bound by the terms 
of the agreement, including the payment of common benefit fees.  
Regardless of the legal basis given to explain its use, the 
common benefit doctrine has been consistently used and is well 
established as the justification for the payment of common benefit 
fees in MDLs. But how is it calculated, who is eligible to receive it, 
and how much should each applicant receive? These inquiries are 
discussed in turn in the following Sections. Before proceeding to 
these topics, it is necessary to focus on the fees of primary counsel. 
II. FEES OF PRIMARY COUNSEL 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the history, 
computation, and distribution of common benefit fees. But there is a 
symbiotic relationship between the fee for common benefit work 
and the fee of the primary attorney. As mentioned above, the 
common benefit fee comes out of the fee of the primary attorney—a 
slice out of that pie, so to speak. Thus, before the size of that slice 
can be determined, some courts have found it appropriate to first 
consider the size of the pie (the primary attorneys’ fees). At the 
outset, it is important to recognize that judicial review of the fee 
arrangements of the attorneys appearing before the court is not only 
controversial but unpleasant. Some courts have concluded that this 
comes with the territory and have occasionally found it necessary to 
wade into this Serbonian Bog. By and large, the legal bases relied on 
by courts that have reviewed and altered contingent fee contracts in 
MDL cases for reasonableness are similar to the justifications for 
creating a common benefit fee fund, namely: (1) a court’s equitable 
authority to oversee the administration of a global settlement, (2) a 
court’s inherent authority to exercise ethical supervision over the 
parties, and (3) the court’s express authority pursuant to the terms of 
the MDL settlement agreement. It is useful to explore each of these 
bases in more detail. 
The argument that courts use to support their equitable authority 
to review attorneys’ fees emanates from Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23 expressly provides that a district 
court presiding over a class action must scrutinize the attorneys’ fees 
of class counsel to assure that they are reasonable. The transferee 
judge in MDLs should have the same responsibility because MDLs 
are quasi-class actions as their purpose and function—namely, 
efficiency and coordination before a single court—are the same as 
the traditional class action. Furthermore, many MDLs contain 
multiple class actions along with individual claims, and it is not 
unusual to utilize the settlement class vehicle provided by Rule 
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23(e) to resolve the entire matter. Thus, Rule 23 is often an integral 
part of the MDL process. 
With regard to a court’s inherent authority to exercise ethical 
supervision over the parties in MDL matters, courts have relied on 
the broad equitable powers of a federal court over an attorney’s 
contingent fee contract. Pursuant to the court’s supervisory 
authority, the court may address the reasonableness of a contingent 
fee contract even if the parties have not raised the issue.39 District 
courts argue that they necessarily retain the authority to examine 
attorneys’ fees sua sponte because the attorneys’ interests in this 
regard are in conflict with those of their clients.40 Further, the 
potential harm to the public’s perception of the judicial process is 
especially acute in MDLs because of the large number of claimants 
involved. Disproportionate results and inconsistent standards 
threaten to damage the public’s faith in the judicial resolution of 
mass tort litigation by creating an impression of inherent unfairness. 
A significant justification for the MDL process is that it brings 
coordination, efficiency, and uniformity to an inherently, or at least 
potentially, chaotic situation caused by the vast number of cases that 
make up many MDLs. Thus, instead of pursuing individual 
discovery, filing individual motions, preparing individual trial plans, 
and incurring expenses time and time again, attorneys who 
participate in the MDL usually benefit, both in time and expense, 
from a uniform and efficient resolution procedure. The economies of 
scale should cut both ways. Like their attorneys, the claimants 
should also benefit from the uniformity and efficiency of the MDL 
process in the form of reduced fees. 
Finally, with regard to the court’s express authority to review 
fees, the settlement usually contains a specific agreement addressing 
the court’s authority regarding attorneys’ fees. Those opting into the 
settlement agree to be bound by the terms of the agreement. For 
example, the opt-in agreement in the Vioxx MDL provided that the 
transferee court had express authority to modify any provision of the 
agreement in certain limited circumstances if the court determined 
that the provision was “prohibited or unenforceable to any extent or 
in any particular context but in some modified form would be 
enforceable.”41 To the extent that the settlement agreement would be 
unenforceable if it resulted in excessive or unreasonable attorneys’ 
fees that threaten the public interest and reflect poorly on the courts 
or system of justice, the court concluded it had express authority to 
                                                                                                             
 39. Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 40. In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174; In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. 
Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 41. See In re Vioxx, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 554. 
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examine the reasonableness of contingent fee contracts in order to 
protect the claimants and enforce the settlement agreement.42 In 
Vioxx, the MDL court set the primary attorneys’ fees at a maximum 
of 32%, out of which the common benefit fee was to be paid. This 
created uniformity for both the litigants and primary counsel. After 
the primary counsel fees are established or at least considered, it is 
timely to turn to the common benefit fees. 
III. METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING COMMON BENEFIT FEES 
The transferee court must formulate some methodology for 
establishing the total amount of the common benefit fund and some 
procedure for disbursing the fund. The total amount of the common 
benefit fund should be reasonable under the circumstances, and the 
method for distributing it should be fair, transparent, and based on 
accurately recorded data. 
Over the years, courts have employed various methods for 
determining the reasonableness of an award of attorneys’ fees. 
These methods include: (1) the lodestar method, which entails 
multiplying the reasonable hours expended on the litigation by an 
adjusted reasonable hourly rate;43 (2) the percentage method, in 
which the court compensates attorneys who recovered some 
identifiable sum by awarding them a fraction of that sum;44 or (3) 
the blended method, a combination of both methods, in which a 
percentage is selected and cross checked for reasonableness by 
utilizing the lodestar method.45 It is helpful to consider each of these 
methods in turn. 
                                                                                                             
 42. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 614 (E.D. La. 2008). 
 43. See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 583 n.15 (5th 
Cir. 1980); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in 
Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 31 
(2004) (summarizing the lodestar method as a means to calculate attorneys’ fees). 
See generally Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002) (providing analysis and 
discussion of the lodestar method); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984); 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). 
 44. See Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(establishing the percentage method as the sole means to calculate attorneys’ fees 
in common fund cases in the D.C. Circuit); Camden I Condo. Ass’n v. Dunkle, 
946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding the percentage method to be the best 
calculation approach for common fund cases in the Eleventh Circuit); Eisenberg & 
Miller, supra note 43, at 32 (summarizing the percentage method as a means to 
calculate attorneys’ fees). 
 45. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 652 (E.D. La. 
2010) (finding the blended method to be in line with Fifth Circuit precedent and 
the best means to calculate common benefit attorneys’ fees in the instant case); 
Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, 472 F. Supp. 2d 830, 861 (E.D. La. 2007) (using the 
blended percentage approach to calculate attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fifth Circuit 
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Using the lodestar method to calculate attorneys’ fees begins 
with a determination of the reasonable number of hours expended on 
the litigation by those seeking common benefit fees and then 
multiplying the total number of hours by an appropriate hourly 
rate.46 To facilitate this process, it is helpful for the transferee court 
to fix guidelines at the outset of the litigation to establish the type of 
activities performed and expenses incurred by counsel that may 
entitle them to seek payment or reimbursement from the common 
benefit fund.47 These guidelines should include such mundane 
things, among others, as per diem allowances for food, type or class 
of air travel, and daily rates for hotel accommodations. The court 
should also provide a definition of “shared costs” (i.e., costs for 
which the attorney is entitled to immediate reimbursement by the 
PSC) and “held costs” (i.e., costs that the attorney should hold for 
potential reimbursement from the common benefit fund if or when 
the case is successfully resolved from the plaintiffs’ standpoint).48 
To create a record of the type of work performed as well as the costs 
expended by the attorneys performing common benefit work, it is 
also helpful for the transferee court, at an early stage in the 
litigation, to appoint a CPA to receive and vet records periodically 
submitted by counsel. Those attorneys who are seeking or plan to 
seek common benefit fees are expected to contemporaneously report 
their hours, the nature of the work performed, and the expenses 
incurred for common benefit work to the court-appointed CPA.49 
                                                                                                             
 
precedent); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43, at 32 (summarizing the blended 
method as a means to calculate attorneys’ fees). 
 46. See Copper Liquor, Inc., 624 F.2d at 583. 
 47. See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
2047, at 1–2 (E.D. La. July 28, 2009), available at http://www.laed.uscourts 
.gov/Drywall/Orders/Orders.htm (follow “Pretrial Order 9” hyperlink) (outlining 
that “[a]ll time and expenses submitted must be incurred only for work authorized 
in advance by the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee” and that “no time spent on 
developing or processing any case for an individual client (claimant) will be 
considered or should be submitted”); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
1657, 2005 WL 850963, at *2–6 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2005) (pretrial order appointing 
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee) (detailing costs eligible for reimbursement include 
counsel’s recorded billable hours, court costs, travel expenses, clerical expenses, 
and communication costs; establishing concrete limitations on those expenses). 
 48. See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
2047, at 3–5 (E.D. La. July 28, 2009), available at http://www.laed.uscourts 
.gov/Drywall/Orders/Orders.htm (follow “Pretrial Order 9” hyperlink) (Pretrial 
Order No. 9 relating to plaintiffs’ counsel’s time and expense submissions); In re 
Vioxx, 2005 WL 850963, at *4–6. 
 49. See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
2047, at 1–2 (E.D. La. July 28, 2009), available at http://www.laed.uscourts 
.gov/Drywall/Orders/Orders.htm (follow “Pretrial Order 9” hyperlink) (Pretrial 
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These reports are reviewed by the CPA and the court on a regular 
basis during the course of the litigation for compliance with the 
court’s guidelines for recoverable costs and fees and the 
reasonableness of the hours reported. The CPA files a monthly or bi-
monthly report with the court, which is entered into the record under 
seal for release at the appropriate time. Such records are an 
important factor in determining the total reasonable hours spent on 
the case and who actually performed the work that produced the 
result. 
Once the total reasonable hours are determined, the appropriate 
hourly rate must be established. This calculation starts with 
ascertaining the rate charged for comparable work by experienced 
attorneys in the region. When the attorneys come from all parts of 
the country, as is often the case, it is appropriate to use some 
average of the various rates. This figure is then adjusted upward or 
downward based on an analysis of 12 factors known as the “Johnson 
factors”—first formulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 
Inc.50 These factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the 
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to 
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other 
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the 
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time 
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the 
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, 
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of 
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.51 This enhanced or 
discounted figure, as the case may be, is then multiplied by the total 
reasonable hours logged in the case by those seeking common 
benefit fees. The result is the product of the lodestar method. 
                                                                                                             
 
Order No. 9 relating to plaintiffs’ counsel’s time and expense submissions); In re 
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 762–63 (E.D. La. 2011); In re 
Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 
(DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *13 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008); In re Propulsid 
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1355, 2005 WL 3541041, at *1–2 (E.D. La. Nov. 
28, 2005) (pretrial order distributing attorneys’ fee funds); MANUAL, supra note 
12, § 14.214; HIRSCH & SHEEHEY, supra note 24. See generally In re Oil Spill by 
the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL 
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://www.laed.uscourts 
.gov/OilSpill/Orders/Orders.htm (follow “Pretrial Order #9” hyperlink) (Pretrial 
Order No. 9 detailing “Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Time and Expense Submissions”). 
 50. 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 51. Id. See also Von Clark v. Butler, 916 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1990). 
384 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
The lodestar method is not without flaws, especially in common 
fund cases.52 As an influential report by the Third Circuit Task 
Force concluded, the drawbacks of the lodestar method include: (1) 
increased workload on an already overtaxed judicial system; (2) 
inconsistent application of the approach and widely varied fee 
awards; (3) illusory mathematical precision unwarranted by the 
realities of the practice of law; (4) potential for manipulation; (5) 
reward of wasteful and excessive attorney effort; (6) disincentive for 
early settlement; (7) insufficient flexibility for judicial control of 
litigation; (8) discouragement of public interest litigation; and (9) 
confusion and lack of predictability in setting fee awards.53 
In reaction to the difficulties with the lodestar method, courts have 
turned to the percentage method, which bases the common benefit 
award on a percentage of the amount recovered. The percentage 
method gained momentum following the publication of the 
aforementioned Third Circuit Task Force report in 1985. Recognizing 
the “contingent risk of nonpayment” in such cases, courts have found 
that class or lead counsel ought to be compensated “both for services 
rendered and for risk of loss or nonpayment assumed by carrying 
through with the case.”54 Moreover, courts find that the percentage 
method provides more predictability to attorneys and class members, 
encourages settlement, and avoids protracted litigation for the sake of 
racking up hours, thereby reducing the time consumed by the court 
and the attorneys.55 
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the use of 
the percentage method in common fund cases.56 The percentage 
                                                                                                             
 52. See Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award 
Procedure, 70 TEX. L. REV. 865, 867–68 (1992) (finding the lodestar method to be 
“widely condemned” and relaying the “widespread belief” that the method 
generates more costs than benefits). 
 53. See Vaughn R. Walker & Ben Horwich, The Ethical Imperative of a 
Lodestar Cross-Check: Judicial Misgivings About “Reasonable Percentage” Fees 
in Common Fund Cases, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1453, 1456 (2005) 
(summarizing Court Awarded Attorney Fees: Report of the Third Circuit Task 
Force, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985)). 
 54. In re Combustion, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1116, 1132 (W.D. La. 1997) 
(summarizing the various methods used to calculate attorneys’ fees). See In re 
Cabletron, 239 F.R.D. 30, 37 (D.N.H. 2006) (stating that the percentage method 
allows courts to award fees from the fund in a manner that rewards counsel for 
success and penalizes it for failure) (quotation omitted); see also Samuel R. 
Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. PA. L. 
REV. 281 (1977). 
 55. See Walker & Horwich, supra note 53, at 1456–57 (citing In re Activision 
Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1989)); accord In re Diet Drugs, 
582 F.3d 524, 540 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 56. See Camden I Condo. Ass’n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 773–74 (11th Cir. 
1991) (reading Blum v. Stenson, 466 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984), as the Supreme 
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method, however, should not be completely arbitrary, devoid of all 
reality or inconsistent with usual fees for the type of case involved. 
There is not one percentage that should apply to all cases. The 
percentage depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case at issue. A number of courts have reviewed data compiled in 
empirical studies of attorneys’ fees in class actions to determine 
what has been awarded in similar cases to assist them in computing 
the appropriate percentage fee in the case before them.57 The studies 
reveal that the higher the settlement, the lower the percentage of the 
fee.58 For example, in settlements between $190 million and $900 
million, fees between 10% and 12% have been allowed.59 Whereas 
for settlements between $1 million and $2 million, fees between 
32% and 37% have been awarded.60 Of course, the percentages 
allowed in past cases are only guideposts, and each case should be 
analyzed on its own basis with the objective of determining a 
reasonable fee in the case before the court.  
To further ensure that the percentage selected is reasonable, 
many courts have utilized the blended method. Under this method, 
the fee arrived at by the percentage method is cross-checked by the 
lodestar method utilizing the Johnson factors. If the fee arrived at by 
the percentage method is within “the ball park” of the fee that would 
result from the lodestar method, its reasonableness is more 
sustainable. This blended approach has been used by a plethora of 
district courts.61 All circuit courts, including most recently the Fifth 
                                                                                                             
 
Court’s “acknowledgment” of the percentage method in common fund cases); In 
re Prudential-Bache Energy Income P’ships Sec. Litig., 1994 WL 150742 (E.D. 
La. Apr. 13, 1994) (tracing the history of the various methods). 
 57. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43, at 31; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010). 
 58. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 57, at 250. 
 59.  See id. at 265. 
 60.  See id. 
 61. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. La. 2010); In re 
OCA Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 05-2165, 2009 WL 512081, at *19 (E.D. 
La. Mar. 2, 2009); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 586 F. 
Supp. 2d 732, 766, 778 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 472 F. 
Supp. 2d 830, 859–61 (E.D. La. 2007); In re Educ. Testing Serv. Praxis Principles 
of Learning & Teaching: Grades 7-12 Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 612, 628–29 (E.D. 
La. 2006); Batchelder v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531 (N.D. Miss. 
2003); In re Combustion, 968 F. Supp. at 1135–36; Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. 
Sys. Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942 (E.D. Tex. 2000); In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 939 
F. Supp. 493, 499–501 (N.D. Miss. 1996). 
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Circuit, have approved the use of the blended method.62 Once the 
total amount of the common benefit fee is established, it is then 
necessary to determine who is eligible to receive it. 
IV. ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN COMMON BENEFIT FEES 
From the very beginning of an MDL, the transferee court can 
take steps to create a fair and open environment in which all 
interested attorneys have the opportunity to perform work for the 
common benefit of the plaintiff litigants. The court can also 
establish a transparent factual record for an eventual application for 
common benefit fees. Of course, the appointment of a supervising 
PSC is necessary to create centralized leadership and control of the 
litigation, particularly in the mega MDLs.63 But the court, the bar 
associations, the litigants, and the justice system in general have an 
interest in broadening the range of attorney participation in MDL 
cases so that the work is not confined to an elite bar of MDL 
attorneys, which would result in exclusivity, unfairness, or 
discrimination and inure to the disadvantage of litigants and their 
attorneys. To accomplish this while still preserving a centralized 
structure, the transferee court can encourage the PSC to create 
subcommittees comprised of interested plaintiff attorneys not on the 
PSC and assign these attorneys tasks consistent with the duties of 
the PSC.64 The court should announce this policy in its minute 
entries, in open-court meetings, and on its MDL website and invite 
all plaintiffs’ attorneys in the litigation who are interested in doing 
common benefit work to contact the PSC and coordinate their 
efforts through the PSC. In the mega MDLs, it is not unusual for 
hundreds of plaintiffs’ attorneys to perform common benefit work in 
                                                                                                             
 62. See Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 644 
(5th Cir. 2012). In the Union Asset Management Holding case, the Fifth Circuit 
announced: 
To be clear, we endorse the district courts’ continued use of the percentage 
method cross-checked with the Johnson factors. We join the majority of 
circuits in allowing our district courts the flexibility to choose between the 
percentage and lodestar method in common fund cases, with their analyses 
under either approach informed by the Johnson considerations. 
Id. See also Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(averring that the Third Circuit should not “junk” the lodestar method and district 
courts can use it at their discretion and as a check on the percentage method). 
 63. See generally MANUAL, supra note 12, § 10.221. 
 64. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2005 WL 
850963, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2005) (Pretrial Order No. 6) (encouraging the PSC 
to organize “sub-committees comprised of plaintiffs’ attorneys not on the PSC and 
assign[] them tasks consistent with the duties of the PSC”). 
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a coordinated way and become eligible for common benefit fees.65 
The court-appointed CPA records in periodic reports the number of 
hours expended, the type and significance of the work performed, 
and who performed it. Such records are an important factor in 
determining the appropriate total amount of common benefit fee, as 
well as the proper distribution of the common benefit fee among 
those who actually performed the work that produced the result 
achieved. 
V. DISTRIBUTION OF COMMON BENEFIT FEES 
After the total common benefit fund is established, a mechanism 
or procedure must be devised to determine the proper distribution of 
the fund among those attorneys who did the common benefit work. 
It is helpful for the transferee court to get input from the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys who occupied leadership roles, those who actually did the 
work both in the MDL and the state courts, and a third party, 
someone outside of this group, who can bring an objective 
perspective to the issue. But in the end, it is the transferee court’s 
responsibility to set the common benefit fee and determine how it is 
to be distributed.66 
In the Vioxx litigation, the transferee court appointed an 
allocation committee consisting of several members of the PSC as 
well as several attorneys who were not on the PSC but who did 
significant work in either the MDL or the various state court cases 
that coordinated with the MDL.67 In addition to the allocation 
committee, the court appointed a Special Master to provide another 
perspective. 
More than 100 attorneys applied for common benefit fees and 
submitted supporting documents. The attorneys sent applications 
and supporting material to the allocation committee, which 
                                                                                                             
 65. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 762 (E.D. La. 
2011) (“All interested attorneys, including those in the state court litigations, were 
encouraged to coordinate with the PSC and to do work for the common benefit. 
Over one hundred firms or attorneys availed themselves of the opportunity to 
perform common benefit work.”). 
 66. In the Turner v. Murphy Oil USA case, the court initially left allocation of 
common benefit funds to the PSC, finding that the small number of attorneys 
involved in the litigation and good working relationships among the group 
fostered a unique situation where unanimity might be possible. 472 F. Supp. 2d 
830 (E.D. La. 2007). The attorneys were unable to reach a consensus on a fee 
allocation though, so the court appointed a Special Master to generate a proposed 
fee allocation. Id. 
 67. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2007) 
(Pretrial Order No. 32), available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/Orders 
.htm (follow “Pretrial Order No. 32” hyperlink). 
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proceeded to review them and set up interviews with the applicants. 
Each applicant was given an opportunity to explain his or her 
position and offer any other material or testimony supporting the 
request, all of which was recorded and compiled into transcripts.68 
After this was completed in an orderly but expedited fashion, the 
allocation committee made tentative recommendations to the 
court.69 The committee then met privately with each involved 
attorney, advised that attorney of the committee’s proposed fee 
allocation for the attorney’s work, and invited a response. These 
meetings, in a few instances, resulted in minor adjustments.70 
Thereafter, the allocation committee made a final 
recommendation to the court. This recommendation, which 
contained the allocation committee’s recommended common benefit 
fee for each applicant, was made public on the court’s website.71 
The court gave the applicants a deadline to object to the allocation 
committee’s recommendations, and it subsequently received 19 
objections.72 The court met with the objectors and advised them to 
select a lead and liaison counsel from among their number. 
The process then continued before the Special Master.73 The 
transcripts and the documentation compiled by the allocation 
committee were sent to the Special Master for his review. The 
Special Master then met with lead and liaison counsel for the 
objectors and lead and liaison counsel for the allocation committee 
and set a discovery and briefing schedule and a hearing date. Several 
depositions were taken, the issues were briefed, and the matter 
proceeded to a formal hearing before the Special Master where 
testimony and documents were admitted. Promptly thereafter, the 
Special Master issued a report setting forth his recommendations, 
sent the report to all interested parties, and posted it on the court’s 
website. The court then set a deadline for objections and received 
only four.74 
At this point the court had before it the report of the allocation 
committee; the transcript and documents compiled by the allocation 
committee; the depositions, briefs, and transcript compiled by the 
Special Master, as well as his report; and the data showing the hours 
logged, costs expended, and the nature of the work performed. The 
court prepared a summary chart listing the name of each fee 
applicant, a cross column for each category of work performed by 
                                                                                                             
 68. In re Vioxx, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 765. 
 69. Id. at 766–67. 
 70. Id. at 767. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 768. 
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the applicant, and the total time logged in performing that task. The 
categories included such things as: preparing pleadings; taking or 
assisting in depositions; participating in written discovery; writing 
briefs; arguing motions; preparing for trial; participating in trials, 
appeals, or settlement negotiations; and administration and committee 
leadership. Each category was assigned a number with categories 
such as participating in trials, participating in settlement negotiation, 
taking depositions, writing briefs, and committee leadership having a 
larger number. A total of these numbers generally revealed the 
individuals who performed the most significant work in resolving the 
litigation. 
The court reviewed all of this material and issued its opinion 
setting out the allocation of the common benefit fee among the 
attorneys who performed common benefit work. For each attorney 
who sought common benefit fees, the court discussed the type of the 
work performed, the hours logged, the resources expended, and such 
other factors that inured to the common benefit of the plaintiff 
litigants.75 Two of the objectors filed notices of appeal, but these 
notices were eventually withdrawn. When the opinion became final, 
the appropriate allocations were made.76 
CONCLUSION 
Each MDL is usually complex and always unique; this is in the 
DNA of this type of litigation. There is no one way of dealing with 
the multitudinous issues that erupt during the course of the litigation. 
This is certainly true when it comes to determining the amount and 
appropriate distribution of the common benefit fee. Every MDL will 
have its own peculiarities that will call for some distinct approach. 
But whatever approach is used, it is helpful if it is developed as 
early as possible, is transparent, includes input from all interested 
participants, and contains a multilayered process for deciding the 
amount of each distribution. 
  
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. at 774–825. See also Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 
797 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig, MDL No. 1355, 2005 WL 
3541041 at *1–2 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2005); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 
F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 76. See In re Vioxx, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 774. 
